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Following Nelson and Winter’s (1982) evolutionary critique of neoclassical view of 
technical change and economic growth, there appeared an abundant literature on 
National Innovation Systems (NIS) putting an emphasis on learning processes and 
institutions as important factors that shape the dynamics of growth in each country. 
Some scholars extended the  discussion to sub-national territories, thereby giving 
origin to a new approach to regional development based on the concept of Regional 
Innovation Systems (RIS). Production and transfer of knowledge, and the role of 
institutions, are two major research domains in those strands of economics literature. 
However, the first one is largely dominated by H. Simon’ cognitivism, which is under 
serious critique from a naturalist perspective; the second is mostly descriptive, lacking 
an ontological understanding of institutions. Drawing on cognitive sciences research 
and on Niklas Luhmann sociology, the paper critically discusses the assumptions used 
in the above-mentioned literature, and argues for a bridge between evolutionary 
economics and natural sciences that could accommodate the specifics of social 
phenomena. 
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1. Introduction1 
We are contemporaries of a dramatic change in the way our societies organise 
interactions across space, which is being called ‘globalisation’.2 Territorial 
societies, be they national or sub-national, are more and more affected by 
globalisation processes on the economic, decisional and structural dimensions 
of their life.3 This should not be seen as a mechanistic relationship, because 
national and local actors always mediate (by resisting or managing) the impact 
of globalisation on territories and, on the other hand, they take initiatives that 
interfere in its course. This interactive multi-level process is giving origin to a 
global system increasingly complex and unpredictable that presents emergent 
features of a new kind. Moreover, the fact that the emergent global system 
lacks regulatory institutions that could enhance its self-organisation makes 
some authors say that “the great national movements for democracy, liberty 
and social justice that took place in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries within nation-states now have to be reproduced globally. No less will 
do.” (Giddens and Hutton, 2000: 223). 
Taking the above-presented background, this paper acknowledges the 
explanatory potential of an evolutionary approach in economics, which 
provides a fruitful ontological and epistemological framework for a research 
focused on current processes of global competition. In fact, similarly to the 
emergence of natural systems, globalisation may be seen as the on-going 
production of a new (social) system with specific characteristics that are not 
found in its components, and although it arises from the interaction of lower-
level actors, it feeds-back over them exerting what is usually called ‘downward 
                                                 
1  A previous version of this paper has been presented at the conference ‘Inovação Tecnológica 
e Globalização – Implicações para os Países de Desenvolvimento Intermédio’, ISCTE, Lisbon, 
23-24 Oct. 2003. 
2 I take from Held et al. (2000: 55) the following definition of globalisation: “a process (or set of 
processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and 
transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating 
transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and exercise of 
power.” 
3 In this paper the word ‘territories’ means spatial communities built on intense economic and 
social interaction, either at national or sub-national level, while ‘region’ refers to sub-national 
territories that may comprise different ‘local productive systems’ and have demographic and 
economic scale for policy decentralisation.   2
causation’ (Emmeche et al., 1997; Bhaskar, 1979). In fact, the emerging global 
economic system and the economic (sub)systems that it comprises (e.g. 
economic agglomerations, nations, regions, global firms, MNE) are mutually 
constitutive and thus co-evolve in the broader social and natural environment. 
This evolutionary approach is an adequate frame for the understanding of 
relations between Local Productive Systems (LPS) and Multi-national 
enterprises (MNE). In the last decades of twentieth century appeared a new 
type of actor, the ‘global firm’ or the ‘integrated MNE’, which adopts a holistic 
management of its operations by organising its chain-value as a global network 
of activities. This global firm takes advantage of the geographical distribution 
of resources and capabilities across the world by means of an efficiency-seeking 
foreign direct investment (FDI) policy that may target three kinds of cross-
border specialisation: horizontal, vertical and asset augmenting (Dunning, 
2000). The first one addresses the geographical allocation of each product; the 
second allocates different stages of a given production; the third is a mixed 
policy of FDI aiming to explore local R&D and other wealth-creating 
competencies mainly located in developed countries. In the cases of horizontal 
and vertical policies, the MNE tend to locate their affiliates in the proximity of 
clusters of related firms in order to benefit from what Storper (1995) has called 
‘untraded interdependencies’. 
This new geography of production expanded through the nineties and 
began to destabilise a large number of LPS in countries of different levels of 
development. Before the nineties, LPS originated external economies and, in 
some cases, an innovative environment that enabled their small and medium-
sized firms (SME) to countervail the economies of scale exploited by MNE. 
Henceforth, conditions for competition in the globalising economy have 
changed, as much for successful ‘industrial districts’ in Italy as for other LPS 
across the world (Markusen, 1996; Whitford, 2001). 
So far, the empirical analysis of the above-mentioned changes does not 
support the idea that MNE are becoming placeless networks for which factors 
of production are highly mobile and all locations are easily substitutable   3
(Storper, 2000). For instance, even in developing areas of the world where an 
important part of local production is integrated in global commodity chains, 
local entrepreneurship plays an important role in the geographical allocation of 
MNE’s production orders. Besides costs, MNE also take account of other 
factors related to time responsiveness and quality standards, which are 
important for the organisation of flexibility. Those qualitative dimensions of 
global competition are largely cluster specific because subcontracted SME 
usually rely on a common pool of labour competencies and a network of locally 
supplied services. At least so far, the phenomenon of ‘deterritorialised’ 
networks of production still accounts for a limited share of MNE economic 
activity despite the importance given by media to cases of delocalisation. 
However, the recent integration of China in World Trade Organisation will 
certainly increase price competition and accelerate some of the above-
mentioned disruptive trends in LPS of developed countries.  
Therefore, from the standpoint of a developing territory, the crux for a 
successful strategy in the current ‘globalising learning economy’ is to become 
specific (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999) and manage the integration of MNE in 
the local economy up to the creation of important switching costs (Schmitz, 
2004).4 Lündvall and the school of Aalborg have emphasised the circular 
process between globalisation and the need for learning, which produces a 
‘transformation pressure’ to adjust and innovate. In this changing context, 
more dynamic LPS of developed countries (but also of intermediate levels of 
development) are seeking to build innovative environments based  on 
systematic private-public co-operation, which “helps to safeguard existing 
jobs, embed existing foreign plants, promote more robust linkages between 
these plants and indigenous firms, and helps to disseminate ‘best practice’ 
throughout the regional economy” (Morgan, 1997: 501). However, these 
processes of social change seem to be beyond the training economists have been 
receiving, which is mostly focused on efficient resource allocation and 
                                                 
4 For a definition of ‘learning economy’ see Lündvall and Archibugi (2001: 1): “Individuals and 
institutions need to renew their competencies more often than before, because the problems 
they face change more rapidly. (…) The key to success is, rather, rapid learning and forgetting 
(when old ways of doing things get in the way of learning new ways)”.   4
equilibrium conditions. Yet, competition by innovation is about creation of 
new resources, it is about dynamics (Metcalfe, 1998). 
In fact, globalisation also challenges economic science, which is (very 
slowly) changing in order to understand the complex and interdependent 
processes at work in different dimensions and geographical scales. For instance, 
the new-institutionalist school (Williamson, 1985) revised some assumptions of 
neoclassical economics and produced extensive research based on the concept 
of transaction costs. However, new institutionalism still remains an economics 
of allocation of resources, which is not adequate to deal with a learning 
economy. Further, his understanding of human behaviour in terms of rational 
choice theory, and its failure to see institutions as an emergent level that 
moulds the preferences of individuals make new institutionalism inadequate 
for research about socio-economic processes of change (Hodgson, 2000).   
In the beginning of the nineties different strands of non-mainstream 
economists converged into a new approach to capitalism dynamics by placing 
institutions at the core of innovation processes and economic growth. Inspired 
by the seminal work of Nelson and Winter (1982), a growing literature began 
to study national innovation systems (NIS) (Lündvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) and 
assumed an evolutionary orientation although the concept remained rather 
vague. Taking account that this new conceptual background inspires much of 
current research on territorial strategies of change (Gottardi, 1996), in the next 
section I will look closer to this ‘systems of innovation’ literature. 
2. Systems of innovation: problematic underpinnings 
The NIS literature argues that there are national specificities regarding 
structure and functioning of markets, firms’ technological capabilities, 
institutions, a nd mechanisms for selecting and diffusing innovations. 
According to Gregerson and Johnson (1997: 482) 
The idea that lies at the centre of the concept of innovation systems is 
that the overall innovation performance of an economy depends not only 
on how specific organizations like firms and research institutes perform,   5
but also on how they interact with each other and with the government 
sector in knowledge production and distribution. 
In this definition there are two issues that I will discuss briefly: the 
systemic nature of innovation processes, and their cognitive dimension. 
The idea that interactions between firms, research organisations, and the 
state, are at the basis of learning processes is a crucial one and admittedly 
points to the existence of a ‘system of innovation’ (henceforth SI). The 
specification of this system is supposed to include the most important 
determinants of innovation, or its explanatory factors. But Edquist (1997:15) 
admits that “we simply do not know in detail what all the determinants of 
innovation are”, and finally recognises that the ‘system’ concept is ambiguous 
as far as “none of the major authors provide a sharp guide to what exactly 
should be included in a ‘[national] system of innovation’; they do not define 
the limits of the systems in an operational way” (p. 27).5 
The SI literature began with an emphasis on the national level, and 
proceeded with an exploration of a ‘technological systems’ concept addressing 
specific ‘technology fields’ (not necessarily within an industrial sector), which 
may crisscross national innovation systems (NIS) and regional innovation 
systems (RIS). On the issue of geographical scale, Howells (1999: 67) recalls 
Metcalfe’s (1995) observation that “the national unit may be too broad a 
category to allow a clear understanding of the complete dynamics of a 
technological system”. Other authors stress the role of sub-national 
interactions, and Cooke and Morgan (1998: 203) argue for a multi-level 
approach: “The point is that all three levels – global, national, and regional- 
have their relative importance and the research challenge is to tease out how 
and in what ways”. 
It is acknowledged that the SI approach to innovation draws on 
evolutionary economics (McKelvey, 1997; Saviotti, 1997). This stream differs 
from neo-classical economics at least in the following issues: heterogeneity of 
agents in cognitive and behavioural terms; endogenous dynamic nature of 
                                                 
5 Cooke (1998: 11) also recognises that “in the literature on innovation, the term ‘system’ is not 
analysed in great detail.”   6
complex economic systems, thus involving open-ended processes, uncertainty 
and path dependency; at least f or some authors, adoption of the broad 
Darwinian scheme of evolution (variation, selection, and retention of 
characters). In the latter sense, the term ‘evolution’ goes largely beyond the 
idea of change along time to assume analogies between economic mechanisms 
and those of natural selection in biology.6 
A crucial point in the SI literature is the generalised absence of an 
ontological statement about these ‘systems’. What is their ultimate reality? 
McKelvey (1997: 201) states: “systems of innovation are constituted by 
innovative activities. (…) Innovative activities are therefore here defined as 
knowledge-seeking activities to develop novelty of economic value.” In fact, 
the definition begs the question about the ontology of these ‘knowledge-
seeking activities’. In that literature most authors do not address this 
methodological issue. An exception is Cooke (1998: 11; italics mine) who gives 
an explicit ontological answer albeit ignoring its implications: “Clearly, an 
innovation system is a social system, and innovations are the result of social 
interaction between economic actors. Furthermore, it is an open system in 
interaction with its environment.” 
Thus, the ontological question remains: is there a social system able to 
define its borders and maintain itself along time like natural systems? In the 
case of a living system this implies a definition of borders that include the 
components belonging to it and exclude those who belong to the environment. 
Living systems are more sophisticated than physical-chemical systems; in the 
former the processes through which the system creates and maintains its 
borders are part of its nature and functioning. Contradicting the stated 
biological inspiration, most evolutionary economists do not discuss in these 
terms the ‘systemness’ of the SI they study. Researchers define a set of 
organisations and institutions according to pragmatic (operational) criteria, 
instead of building on existing sociological research about social structures, be 
                                                 
6 For a thorough discussion on this point see Hodgson (1993). In the next section I attempt to 
argue that we should go further and accept a common ontology of human beings and natural 
systems that preserves the specifics of each level of emergence.   7
they systems or not. In fact, SI literature most frequently adopts a 
mechanistic (first-order) cybernetics that is radically inadequate for the study 
of social systems.7 
Within the SI literature it is common to invoke analogies with natural 
systems and Darwinism as a source of inspiration, and at the same time stress 
that there is no mechanical transfer of concepts into economic analysis.8 In 
doing so evolutionary economics builds on problematic underpinnings. On the 
one hand, evolutionary authors separate human behaviour from the rest of 
nature following the idea that human nature is radically different. But this is a 
misstated argument taking account of current interdisciplinary research 
(Archer, 2000).9 On the other hand, they create an inadequate divide between 
their epistemic approach (economic theories) and the ontology of social 
systems, which frequently display properties similar to those of natural 
systems. 
The attempt to take an excessively cautious distance from natural sciences 
research also has important implications in the concepts of knowledge and 
information adopted by evolutionary SI literature. See for instance Saviotti 
(1997: 192): 
Innovation systems are very knowledge intensive. (…) These different 
types of knowledge are often created and transmitted by different types 
of institutions, but they have to be combined into the production of final 
outputs. In order to study these flows of knowledge a number of 
generalizations which are applicable to the different types of knowledge 
have emerged. 
It is important to observe that expressions like ‘types of knowledge’, ‘to be 
combined’, and ‘flows of knowledge’ reveal an implicit assumption: knowledge 
                                                 
7 First-order cybernetics applies to input-output systems that mechanically adapt to changes 
in the environment. Second-order cybernetics adopts the point of view of a living system, 
which organises exchanges with the environment in order to preserve its autonomy. See Heylighen 
and Joslyn (2001) for the history of cybernetics and its concepts. 
8 See Saviotti (1997: 183): “Biology can be a very powerful source of inspiration for 
evolutionary economics, but in the sense of allowing us to formulate new questions and 
problems and not in providing biological answers to economic problems.” 
9 See also Hodgson (2002a) for a detailed critique of these arguments. For a complementary 
view of a biologist see Corning (1996: 8): “the claim that ‘humans alone’ can invent new 
adaptive strategies is totally at odds with the extensive evidence that other organisms are able 
do so as well, although humans obviously excel in this respect.”   8
is a ‘thing’ (a commodity) that can be accumulated and transferred. In the 
same vein, McKelvey (1997: 203) states: “In order to avoid confusion, we can 
distinguish between ‘information’ which exists independent of 
receiver/transmitter and ‘knowledge’, that is, information which has been 
translated so that humans understand it.” In brief, it is accepted that 
knowledge is subjective (‘an interpretive structure’) but may be converted into 
information by using codes (‘codified knowledge’). In this case, communication 
transmits information, which is understood as codified knowledge. Besides the 
distinction between information and knowledge, it is usual to refer to ‘tacit 
knowledge’ that is associated to personal skills, a ‘type of knowledge’ that 
cannot be codified.10 
In fact, this understanding of knowledge and information is deeply inspired 
by the cognitivism of Herbert Simon, which is challenged by contemporary 
neurobiological research (Núñez and Freeman, 2000). In fact, most 
evolutionary economics accepts uncritically the cognitivist explanation of 
mind-brain relations according to the computer metaphor, and therefore 
frequently use terms like ‘knowledge accumulation’ or ‘retrieval of knowledge’ 
in memory, the latter viewed as a container in the brain (‘hard-disk’). The 
crucial point is that SI authors maintain with natural sciences a rather timid 
dialogue that is not favourable to the acknowledgement and adoption of 
results coming from modern interdisciplinary study of knowledge and 
information. 
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that human beings are deeply rooted 
in nature, not only by their biology but also by their minds (Capra, 1996; 
Donald, 2001). Taking account of this basic unity, we should see human 
cognition as an evolved capability of mind that operates in intimate relation 
with the overall dimensions of the person (Christensen and Hooker, 2000; 
Damasio, 1994; Donald, 2001). Humans are not born with ‘predetermined 
structures’ in higher cerebral centres that put labels (‘encode’) neural signals 
                                                 
10 These authors accept the misreading of Michael Polanyi (1966) made by Nelson and Winter 
(1982). Denying this duality (tacit versus codified), Polanyi actually presented a unitary process 
of knowing that always needs, in more or less extent, a ‘tacit dimension’. About this point see 
Chia (2002) and Bateira (2005).   9
coming from the periphery. Each human being is constituted through social 
interaction, and the meanings he acquires along life come from a complex 
process involving neural networking, hormones, imagination and emotions. In 
brief, knowledge belongs to the continuous flow of a personal (embodied and 
embedded) experience (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). Thus, when we refer to 
knowledge we must bear in mind that it is indeed a personal sense-making 
process; our words are of a different nature as part of an institution we call 
language, which we learn and use to manage our social relations in the 
environment we live. 
Certainly, we engage in communication and this is the way we learn. But, 
through an act of communication I do not send ‘codified knowledge’. I send 
signals (words of a language) that are understood by anyone who has lived 
personal experiences similar to mine while learning that same language, 
therefore attributing to those signals identical meanings.11 Indeed, in 
communications there is no objective information. Meanings are not attached 
to the words; they are constructed in our minds through social interaction that 
also uses words (Bickhard, 1987; Deacon, 1997). This naturalist understanding 
led Brier (2002/2003) to argue that human communications always involve an 
articulation of three types of autopoietic systems12: biological (brain and the 
rest of the body),  psychological  (ultimate interpretant  of signs), and 
communicational (in the sense given by Niklas Luhmann). 
To sum up, I suggest that the concept of SI (national, regional, or 
technological) is not supported by any theory of social systems. Further, 
although most of the literature acknowledges the inspiration of biological 
analogies, it does not use even in a metaphorical sense the concept of a living 
system as accepted in biology, which is based on second-order cybernetics. 
                                                 
11 Lakoff and Johnson (1999) argue that  personal knowledge is deeply moulded by 
metaphorical thought. Primary metaphors used in communication are stable for long time as 
they come out of relationships between  the same body’s structure and the same natural 
environment human beings share. There are also (not so stable) complex metaphors that are 
built  out of the primary ones and of multiple forms of cultural manifestations as widely 
accepted beliefs, folk theories, etc. In this sense there are some objective conditions for the 
relative stability of concepts we need in order to communicate and live. 
12 Autopoiesis is a particular mode of systems’ self-organisation. According to Whitaker (1995), 
“autopoiesis involves both organization preservation and componential (re-)production”.   10
Finally, knowledge and information are commonly understood and discussed in 
the SI literature according to concepts taken from the cognitivist paradigm 
much diffused by Simon, which lacks support from modern interdisciplinary 
research coming from biology, neurosciences, developmental psychology, and 
embodied semantics. 
3. Luhmann’s social systems and innovation 
The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann gave important contributions to the 
understanding of social systems (Arnoldi, 2001), which so far have not been 
recognised within evolutionary economics. Luhmann draw on the research of 
biologists Maturana and Varela, dating back from the sixties, and used their 
concept of autopoietic systems to theorise social systems. He argued that social 
systems are systems of communication that make sense of their environment: 
Hence, Luhmann’s work is neither on how actions are coordinated into 
action systems, nor an attempt to describe social order through actors’ 
experiences of others. Instead, it concerns meaning-processing social 
systems, excluding the actors point of view but including sense-making. 
(Arnoldi, 2001: 3-4). 
Those systems ‘observe’ their environment and make the crucial distinction 
between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Or, using the words of Arnoldi (2001: 5), “the 
distinction is meaning-constituting because it contains its own (self-reference) 
outside. (…) That is, the observation constitutes the observer.” 
For Luhmann (1995/1984), ‘societies’ are comprehensive social systems 
that developed the property of internal differentiation, which is the repetition 
inside the system-society of distinctions between  particular types of 
communications and their environment thereby self-constituting various 
‘functional systems’; for instance, political system, economic system, law 
system, education system, and so on.13 Vanderstraeten (2001: 305) synthesises 
this view of modern societies in the following: 
Each of these subsystems accentuates, for its own communicative 
processes, the primacy of its own function. Each establishes a specific, 
highly selective set of system/environment relations and privileges its own 
                                                 
13  Luhmann (1995/1984) considered three broad types of social systems: societies, 
organisations, and interactions.   11
directive distinction  (e.g. true/false, have/have-not, legal/illegal, 
rulers/opposition). Function systems are not differentiated as regions of 
being, but by means of their modes of operating and observing. 
According to Luhmann’s understanding there is no functional system that 
could steer the whole society because, being autopoietic systems, each 
functional system conducts its operations on its own terms. Although the 
political system aims at regulating all the other functional systems, in fact it 
only succeeds in influencing them in indirect ways as far as it changes their 
environment. In complex societies there is no centre of command, and each 
functional system belongs to the environment of each other.14 
Looking at social systems in these terms has important implications for the 
discussion of SI. So far there is no specific type of communication arising from 
innovation  processes  that could be able to make distinctions so as to self-
constitute an identity, to emerge as a system that could play the particular 
function of generating innovation in modern societies. In fact, from a 
Luhmannian point of view, communications within and between firms, science 
organisations, or state agencies actually are of a different nature. Each of these 
social systems has its established meanings, and makes specific distinctions 
that preserve its own identity. Therefore, what the SI literature fails to see 
with its mechanistic metaphor is a crucial aspect of social systems: those 
different ways of making sense of the environment are at the root of the widely 
acknowledged difficulties of public programmes in addressing the so-called 
‘transfer of knowledge’ from universities into firms. 
Following the above-mentioned theoretical framework, it is useful to 
critically analyse the SI concept at the light of a distinction between ‘system 
integration’ and ‘social integration’. Luhmann (1996: 344) himself recalled 
these concepts: 
Using David Lockwood’s (1976) famous distinction between social 
integration and systems integration we can understand social integration 
as the integration of different autopoietic systems (e.g. minds and social 
                                                 
14  This has important implications for the quality of modern democracies. For instance, to 
improve the influence of the political system on the whole society politicians need to integrate 
in their rationality the way their communicative acts are perceived and understood by other 
functional systems. They need a reflexive way of observing their environment.   12
systems, but this would include also brains and minds and cells and 
brains) and system integration as the integration of subsystems based on 
the same type of autopoietic operations. 
The above-mentioned distinction has important implications for our 
analysis. Within society, firms belong to a particular functional system 
(‘economic system’) as far as they are created through a specific type of 
communications and accomplish an economic function. Improving 
coordination of different firms within this system corresponds to a higher degree 
of integration of the economic system. The same holds within the science 
system in the research activities of universities and other scientific bodies, and 
within the state in its multiple administrative forms and geographical levels. 
On the other hand, when we consider “the reciprocal restriction of the degrees 
of freedom”  between  different functional systems (economic, science, state) 
through changes in the environment of each other, we should refer to social 
integration.15 
Those distinctions lead to a radical implication in our discussion of the SI 
concept: there is no such ‘System of Innovation’ that could self-organise 
according to specific communicative acts centred on innovation, or reproduce 
its structures according to a specific mode of making distinctions. From a 
Luhmannian perspective, we do not find in our societies a SI; however, we do 
find  societies that are more or less integrated, and the characteristics of this 
integration certainly bear on their degree of innovativeness. This makes an 
important difference, theoretically and in terms of policy-making, as I will 
discuss later. 
Arguing the ontological inexistence of a SI does not mean the automatic 
rejection of everything that so far has been proposed by evolutionary 
economics literature about innovation processes. However, adopting the point 
of view of Luhmann for social systems, we gain a new (and hopefully useful) 
analytical insight that is inspired by natural sciences research, thereby filling 
                                                 
15 In fact, when Lündvall (1992) and Nelson (1993) discuss national systems of innovation they 
are addressing the specificities of highly integrated  national societies. At a sub-national level 
society’s integration is lower, even in politically autonomous regions such as Catalonia (Riba 
and Leydesdorff, 2001)   13
the interdisciplinary gap mentioned in the previous section. Further, building 
bridges between evolutionary economics and natural sciences illuminates the 
need of a shift from policies centred on financial incentives in line with the neo-
classical view of human nature (Davis, 2003), towards policies centred on 
learning processes in different types of organisations (Brown and Duguid, 
2001), on creating cross-border organisations that enable communications 
between different functional systems (Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2000), and on 
reflexive policy-making that introduces learning processes within the state 
(Jessop, 1997). 
Policy implications of a naturalist understanding of knowledge merit a 
closer look. As far as knowledge is an embodied and embedded experience, 
there is no such transfer of ‘codified knowledge’ that could be appropriated by 
a receiver. Only those who have acquired similar experiences, attended similar 
education and training, and/or have interacted intensely with each other (thus 
belonging to an ‘epistemic community’), are in condition of giving similar 
meanings to a communicative act. This implies that the ‘appropriability’ 
argument about R&D activities only holds within the borders of circumscribed 
communities. 
For those actors who have not a similar background there is a case for 
innovation policy aiming to foster learning processes. Taking a non-Cartesian 
understanding of knowledge, and in basic accordance with Lündvall’s initial 
intuition, I argue that learning needs interaction not only within networks of 
firms but also between firms and real services suppliers in order to take off the 
initial knowledge burden that impede the adoption of new technologies.16 As 
argued by Attewell (1996: 213): 
provision of these services by mediating institutions does enable user 
organizations to adopt a complex technology without (initially) having 
to acquire a full range of technical knowledge in-house, and hence is 
functional for diffusion. 
                                                 
16  The importance of real services to SME becomes more evident i f we take account of two 
concepts related to learning: ‘absorptive capacity’ is needed to cross a cognitive distance 
between two persons, and ‘communicative capacity’ is needed to help others understand what 
we do or say. About these concepts see Nooteboom (2000).   14
Continued interaction with go-between organisations, combined with 
adequate market incentives, should create conditions for a shift from service to 
self-service. SME of low-tech industries in developing regions are good 
candidates to this capability-building policy, which in the last years has been 
object of some experimentation and evaluation in different European regions 
(Asheim et al., 2003). 
4. Innovation policy in developing societies 
Although SME networking appears to be the adequate policy direction to 
promote learning processes, there remains the problem of how to make it work 
in developing regions. LPS of these regions face huge difficulties to achieve 
differentiated input-output relations and locally specific technological 
knowledge. At the same time, those developing societies fail to produce the 
‘institutional thickness’ that could sustain the new forms of local association 
that feed learning processes (Amin and Thrift, 1995).17 
After Putnam (1993) a vast literature on local institutions has been 
produced, with a particular emphasis on the importance of trust for actors’ co-
operation. Connecting with the work of Luhmann, Bachmann (2001: 342) 
presents ‘trust’ as a foundational mechanism of social co-ordination: 
at the origin of t he social world lies the constitution of successful 
generalised forms of social practices induced by individuals’ repeated 
decisions to co-operate with each other rather than remaining in 
isolation. In any case, such mechanisms are essential in regard to the 
constitution of differentiated social systems. 
This basic mechanism involves someone’s assumption that a trustee will 
not behave opportunistically without guarantees or enforceable promises of 
exchange. It is a necessary but risky engagement that calls for continued search 
of good reasons to be judged acceptable. In this perspective, trust is neither a 
kind of strategy that rational actors use to maximise their interests, as 
Coleman puts it, nor it comes out of the need to reduce costs of opportunistic 
                                                 
17 I use the term ‘institutions’ in the sense of old institutionalists. For firms, universities, and 
other social actors, I use the term ‘organisations’ in the sense of Luhmann as presented in the 
previous section.   15
behaviour, as viewed by Transaction Cost Economics. Although both Coleman 
and Luhmann argue that institutions help social actors to assess the risk of 
trust investments, there are important differences between both authors: 
Luhmann, who rejects the concept of solipsistic and solely calculation-
oriented actors, suggests that institutions are to be understood as 
reducing risk by providing patterns of social behaviour which in a non-
deterministic manner orient social actors’ expectations and decisions 
(Bachmann, 2001: 345). 
This means that the interplay between institutions and individual 
behaviour is of a recursive nature, which preserves individual’s freedom to 
break the rules; both formal and informal institutions “do their job in a latent 
manner”. Hodgson (2002b: 173, emphasis mine) argues for a similar 
understanding of the macro-micro process: 
In general, the causal processes of reconstitution [of individuals’ 
preferences] discussed here are not mysterious ‘social forces’ but well-
known psychological mechanisms of imitation, conformism, conditioning 
and cognition. (…) Recognition of the ideational facets of institutions is a 
partial safeguard against the mistake of reification. This error is to regard 
institutions or social structures as if they were just things, independent of 
social agency. 
Therefore, the main problem of less developed regions is to build ‘systemic 
trust’, which emerges as an institution from the complex interplay of informal 
agreements between organisations, legal norms and their enforcement, the way 
the financial system works, behaviours of trade associations and public 
administration, the credibility of political authorities, the nature of policy-
making processes, etc. Institutionalised trust emerges by a widely spread 
variety of trust-based behaviours, and in turn reinforces social actors’ 
willingness to co-operate. 
The importance of institutions is acknowledged in SI literature. However, 
it is considered in a rather limited way, as a kind of parameter to take account 
in economic decisions through cost-benefit rationality.18 However, if instead of 
the new institutionalism we call back the old, Veblen-inspired institutionalist 
view, we are able to establish the cognitive link between institutions and   16
actors’ behaviour, and we gain a deeper understanding of the obstacles to 
social change. Two important dimensions derive from this (old institutionalist) 
approach to institutions: the first is the importance of a sense of community 
made up of common norms and values or, as put by Storper (1997: 286), “the 
conventions that define collective identities of the actors in the production 
system by giving them access to a common context of coordination”; the 
second is the need of an infrastructure of discourse and communication, which 
enables cross-border interaction between different functional systems and the 
creation of instituted meanings, thus facilitating social dialogue and 
elaboration of compromises (Amin and Hausner, 1997). 
Building on this institutionalist perspective about inertia and change, it 
becomes clear that innovation policy in developing regions is not simply a 
matter of decentralising policy-making to regional powers. Much more than 
that, innovation policy needs to address the processes of institution building, 
which is not a pre-condition for, but rather the process of social change itself 
(Amin, 1999). Thus, public policy must be based on a careful assessment of 
regional institutions and culture in order to prevent the temptation of taking 
successful regions as models for ‘good practices’ (Hospers and Beugelsdijk, 
2002). 
Following this line of thought, Storper (1997) argues for a policy strategy 
in developing regions based on ‘talk’ and ‘confidence’-building as a first step.19 
Talk between regional actors is a means to achieve mutual understanding, and 
it needs patient efforts to overcome distrust and create weak precedents that 
could underpin a minimal basis for the next steps. In brief, it is a new kind of 
policy experimenting: 
Small experiments build on the communicative understanding t hat 
comes from talk, asking parties to interact by suspending their fears and 
doubts. The likelihood of getting the parties to act as if confidence 
existed, as the first step toward establishing real precedents, should 
                                                                                                                                      
18 See McKelvey (1997: 206): “Institutions will influence the parameters of behavior that 
innovating agents perceive as acceptable and possible, such as which directions of search 
activities are likely to lead to results.” 
19 In a similar vein, see Lündvall (2001: 281): “What is needed is t o bring the right parties 
together in minor cooperative activities so that they can start to build trust”.   17
logically rise with the degree of knowledge they have about each other 
(Storper, 1997: 274). 
In this process, besides the depth of knowledge about specific issues, the 
breadth of knowledge that parties have about each other on different domains 
of their lives plays an important role. Information of this kind is likely to be 
more useful if it can be obtained and validated in the local context, which is an 
important argument for a regional level of innovation policy-making. 
The policy implications above-mentioned are seldom discussed in the SI 
literature, which mostly concentrates on the architecture of organisational 
links, R&D infrastructure, information flows, coordination functions, and 
strategic steering (Cooke, 1998; Acs, de la Mothe and Paquet, 2000). Although 
some of this is certainly necessary, in focusing on a planning approach the SI 
literature misses the crucial point: learning processes and social systems 
dynamics. After all, this is not so strange if we remember that knowledge is 
treated in that literature as something that can be transferred, and (more or 
less easily) ‘captured and accumulated’.  
The perspective argued in this paper should be viewed as a first step in the 
attempt to overcome the above-mentioned contradiction between claims of SI 
literature for an evolutionary label, and its adoption both of Herbert Simon’s 
cognitivist understanding of knowledge and of the new institutionalist 
approach.20 Grounding human nature on a naturalist paradigm, and exploring 
the sociological thinking of Niklas Luhmann, not only supplies a link between 
knowledge, innovation processes and social change that is consistent with 
natural sciences research but also shows the kind of new theoretical approaches 
that could give more consistency to contemporary evolutionary economics.21 
 
                                                 
20 See Viskovatoff (2001) for a view on rationality that is consistent with the perspective 
argued in this paper. 
21 More specifically, my perspective  of evolutionary economics is based on critical realist 
ontology (Lawson, 2003), and on an enlarged Darwinism that accommodates the specific 
nature of socio-cultural evolution (Depew and Weber, 2001).   18
5. Conclusion 
Modern societies have differentiated into multiple functional systems thus 
becoming highly complex systems that cannot be guided by a hierarchical 
command-and-control mode. Under the pressure of globalisation, regional 
policies have been redirected to systematic promotion of partnership as an 
alternative to failing top-down policies and to blind short-run market 
mechanisms. This “complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions and 
systems” (Jessop, 1997: 95) in local societies has been called ‘governance’, and 
became a new buzzword that should be handled cautiously. 
On the analytical level, current emphasis on formal mechanisms of 
governance usually underscores informal institutions, and ignores that an 
organisation is an element of a functional (social) system, which has a specific 
boundary, language, interests, and self-reproduction mechanisms. In this 
context, learning processes across organisations are at least problematic. On 
the policy level, that emphasis on governance corresponds to a certain 
fascination with the ‘associational economy’ and tends to be optimistic about 
the power of local initiatives. It is frequently forgotten that, as an outcome of 
(highly complex) non-controllable social interactions, governance is also prone 
to failure taking account of (unfavourable) national and global ‘downward 
causation’ mechanisms. 
In showing that the state and its agencies are part of a specific (nation-
wide) functional system, albeit one that produces normative orientations for 
the whole society, we also put forward that public policy needs to be reflexive 
in order to acknowledge reactions of other sub-systems. In developing regions, 
this reflexivity is even more important for innovation policy must deal with 
institutional change. Therefore, an evolutionary agenda for innovation policy 
calls for setting aside the neo-classical framework and the adoption of an 
experimental approach to policy-making, both at the national and the regional 
level, in order to foster learning processes (Metcalfe, 2003).22 Like natural 
                                                 
22 According to Metcalfe (2003: 179: “The initial step is to recognise the adaptive nature of the 
policy process and to contrast that with the optimal policy framework which is the corollary of 
the market failure approach.”   19
systems, social systems form a multi-layered reality and their development 
also calls for reflexive and multi-layered innovation policy within the 
framework of an evolutionary paradigm. 
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